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Abstract
& Although the amygdala’s role in processing facial expres-
sions of fear has been well established, its role in the
processing of other emotions is unclear. In particular, evidence
for the amygdala’s involvement in processing expressions of
happiness and sadness remains controversial. To clarify this
issue, we constructed a series of morphed stimuli whose
emotional expression varied gradually from very faint to more
pronounced. Five morphs each of sadness and happiness, as
well as neutral faces, were shown to 27 subjects with unilateral
amygdala damage and 5 with complete bilateral amygdala
damage, whose data were compared to those from 12 brain-
damaged and 26 normal controls. Subjects were asked to rate
the intensity and to label the stimuli. Subjects with unilateral
amygdala damage performed very comparably to controls. By
contrast, subjects with bilateral amygdala damage showed a
specific impairment in rating sad faces, but performed
normally in rating happy faces. Furthermore, subjects with
right unilateral amygdala damage performed somewhat worse
than subjects with left unilateral amygdala damage. The
findings suggest that the amygdala’s role in processing of
emotional facial expressions encompasses multiple negatively
valenced emotions, including fear and sadness. &
INTRODUCTION
A number of lesion and functional imaging studies have
demonstrated the amygdala’s role in processing emo-
tional facial expressions, but its precise importance for
certain emotions remains debated. In particular, while
there are consistent data to implicate the amygdala in
perception and judgments of fear (Whalen et al., 2001;
Broks et al., 1998; Breiter et al., 1996; Calder et al., 1996;
Morris et al., 1996; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Dam-
asio, 1994, 1995; Adolphs, Tranel, et al., 1999), only
some studies have argued also for a role in processing
other negative emotions, especially sadness (Schmolck
& Squire, 2001; Adolphs, Tranel, et al., 1999; Blair,
Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999). Additional data
to suggest that the amygdala may be involved in pro-
cessing sad expressions come from findings that it is
activated during the feeling of sadness (Schneider et al.,
1997; Drevets et al., 1992)—although this finding does
not demonstrate the amygdala’s involvement in percep-
tion of sadness specifically, it nonetheless suggests that
abnormal processing related to the emotion sadness
may be a feature of amygdala dysfunction (in the same
way that fear conditioning, phobias, and fear recognition
all depend on the amygdala). While there are no data
from lesion studies to support the idea that the amyg-
dala is involved in processing happy expressions, some
functional imaging studies have provided evidence for
such a role (Yang et al., 2002; Breiter et al., 1996). One
recent study in fact found amygdala activation (com-
pared with neutral faces) when viewing expressions of
fear, anger, sadness, or happiness (Yang et al., 2002).
These findings challenge the notion that the amygdala is
specialized to process expressions of fear.
It is important to note that the disproportionate
activation to fear compared with other emotions, seen
in most studies, does not rule out some (lesser) activa-
tion to other emotions. Thus, activations to emotional
expressions when contrasted with neutral (Yang et al.,
2002) may be compatible with activation selectively to
fear, when that emotion is contrasted with any other
emotion. One way of investigating these issues would be
to parametrically vary the intensity of each emotion using
computer-generated morphs between neutral and emo-
tional expressions. Using such morphs might also pro-
vide a more sensitive task for detecting possible
impairments following amygdala damage. Subjects with
such damage may be able to produce correct perform-
ances on some tasks if the stimulus provides a sufficiently
intense prototypical feature—such as a broad smile to
signal happiness (Adolphs, 2002).
Clarification of the above controversies would con-
tribute substantially to the theoretical frameworks used
to interpret the data. One view considers the amygdala
a component of a neural system for the rapid, automatic
evaluation of stimuli that signal potential threat or
danger in the environment, of which fearful expressions
may be signals (Adolphs, Russell, & Tranel, 1999;
Adolphs, Tranel, et al., 1999). Others view the amygda-
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la’s role as processing signals of distress (Blair et al.,
1999), thus including fear and sadness, or processing
signals that indicate potentially important environmental
information that must be disambiguated (Whalen et al.,
2001), thus pointing to both fear and surprise, and
perhaps additional emotions (Yang et al., 2002). Yet
other data support the ideas that the amygdala may be
more generally involved in withdrawal-related behaviors
(Anderson, Spencer, Fulbright, & Phelps, 2000), which
would include multiple negatively valenced emotions, or
that it processes the dimension of emotional arousal,
independently of valence (Anderson et al., 2003).
These controversies have persisted in part because the
majority of lesion and of functional imaging studies have
focused on the amygdala’s role in processing facial
expressions of fear, and in processing other fear-related
information. That role is supported by most of the
studies. By contrast, far fewer studies have systematically
examined the amygdala’s role in processing other emo-
tions. Another reason for the inconsistent findings re-
garding the amygdala’s role in judgments of other
emotions may be that different stimuli and different tasks
have been used in various studies. It is thus possible that
some studies were simply more sensitive to possible
impairment, whereas others had insufficient sensitivity
to detect such impairment, or that different tasks and
methods of analysis reveal different patterns of impair-
ment (Schmolck & Squire, 2001; Rapcsak et al., 2000).
To investigate the above issue in more detail, we
generated morphs between a prototypical neutral ex-
pression and prototypical expressions of sadness or
happiness, thus including stimuli that varied in terms of
their sensitivity to judgments of the intended emotion
(cf. Figure 1). Each of these faint morphs thus generated
a series of (typically monotonically increasing) perform-
ances (depicted as the variously colored lines in
Figures 2 and 3). To address the role of the amygdala,
we tested five different subject groups. A normal control
group was used to provide a reference for all other
comparisons. Subjects with amygdala damage consisted
of three groups: those with unilateral left and unilateral
right amygdala damage due to neurosurgical temporal
lobectomy, and those with bilateral amygdala damage
(Table 1). In addition, we included a brain-damaged
control group, comprised by subjects whose brain dam-
age spared the amygdala.
To obtain a detailed assessment of emotion judgment,
and to permit comparisons to previous studies, we used
the two tasks that have been most common in the
literature: rating of the stimulus on all the emotions,
and a forced-choice labeling task in which subjects chose
the word best suited to describe the emotion shown. We
chose our stimuli such that their discriminability from
neutral ranged between 80% and 100%, thus focusing on
stimuli that were just sufficiently different from neutral
that they could be reliably discriminated most of the
time by normal subjects. The accuracy with which the
final set of stimuli can be discriminated from a neutral
face by normal subjects is given in Table 2, together with
the mean rating given to the stimulus on each emotion.
The mean accuracies in labeling the stimuli by normal
subjects are given in Table 3.
RESULTS
Ratings Task
We first asked subjects to rate the morph stimuli on a
scale of 1–10 with respect to the intensity of each of the
basic emotions. This task has been used in a number of
prior studies (Schmolck & Squire, 2001; Adolphs et al.,
1995; Adolphs, Tranel, et al., 1999), circumvents the
issue of what emotion response options are available
to subjects (by explicitly asking them to rate every
individual emotion), and provides a fine-grained assess-
ment of sensitivity to the intensity of specific individual
emotions signaled by the face stimuli.
Subjects with bilateral amygdala damage gave raw
ratings to several of the sad morphs that were more
than 2 SD different from the mean ratings given by brain-
damaged controls. Every subject with bilateral amygdala
damage showed this pattern, and none except AP
showed any such impairment for happy morphs. How-
ever, different raw ratings could arise from both an
impairment in the ability to judge that a morph stimulus
was different from a neutral expression, or from differ-
ent baseline ratings for that emotion, even for neutral
stimuli. To take into account subjects’ baseline ratings
Figure 1. Examples of morph stimuli used. From left to right: morphs between neutral and increasing sadness.
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given to neutral faces, we subsequently calculated all
rating scores as differences from ratings given to neutral
faces (see Methods).
For morphs of happiness, all subject groups showed a
similar pattern of a gradual increase in their ratings as a
function of increasing happiness of the morph stimulus
(Figure 2). Subjects with amygdala damage did not differ
noticeably from brain-damaged controls.
Both normal and brain-damaged groups showed very
similar rating curves for sad morphs (Figure 3), featuring
a gradual increase in sad ratings together with a slight
decrease on happy ratings, and a low level of ratings also
on nonintended emotions of negative valence. No major
deviations from these overall patterns were seen in
subjects with unilateral amygdala damage, although
subjects with unilateral left damage did show a surpris-
ingly high sensitivity to sadness, exhibiting higher-than-
normal ratings of intensity. However, those with bilateral
amygdala damage showed a rather different pattern,
with lower overall ratings on sadness together with
higher ratings on intruding, nonintended emotions.
Especially notable are the high ratings on disgust, and
also somewhat higher ratings on happiness.
A 5 by 5 repeated-measures ANOVA on the ratings of
sadness given to the sad morphs, with factors of subject
group (NC, BDC, left, right, bilateral) and morph degree,
showed a significant effect of both morph degree,
F(4,341) = 4.0, p < .005 and group, F(4,341) = 8.1,
p < .0001. To have a conservative statistic that did not
depend on the assumptions of parametric statistics, we
next applied Mann–Whitney U tests to all pairwise
comparisons between groups, and Bonferroni corrected
for multiple comparisons. The only significant contrasts
were between subjects with unilateral left amygdala
damage and all other groups (subjects with left amyg-
dala damage scored higher), and between subjects with
bilateral amygdala damage and normal controls
( p < .05). Identical analyses for happy ratings given to
the happy morphs showed no significant effects.
To ensure that differences in the group ratings shown
in Figures 2 and 3 were not the result of different sample
sizes in the groups (especially the small sample size of
the bilateral amygdala damaged group), we also calcu-
lated mean rating curves from randomly drawn subsets
of brain-damaged controls. When subsets of n = 5 were
used, a sample size identical to that of the bilateral
Figure 2. Ratings for happy
morphs. The mean rating
difference (from ratings given to
neutral faces) is shown for
increasing morphs of
happiness, for each subject
group. The differently colored
lines show the ratings given on
the different emotion labels
(see legend). BD = brain-
damaged controls with lesions
sparing the amygdala;
L = unilateral left amygdala
damage group; R = unilateral
right amygdala damage group;
Bilat = complete bilateral
amygdala damage group.
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amygdala subjects, we still obtained curves that were
essentially the same as those of the entire brain-dam-
aged group. Thus, the abnormal mean ratings given by
subjects with bilateral amygdala damage when rating sad
morphs (Figure 3) did not result simply from the smaller
sample size of this group.
To obtain a quantitative measure of these patterns, we
calculated correlations between each subject’s rating
profile and the mean normal control rating profile for
a given stimulus (Adolphs et al., 1995; Adolphs, Tranel,
et al., 1999). When the magnitude of this correlation was
plotted as a function of the increasing morph for each
emotion, we obtained plots that corroborated the above
patterns (Figure 4): Subjects with bilateral amygdala
damage showed abnormal patterns of ratings to morphs
of sadness (notably morphs 7 and 8), but not happiness.
Figure 3. Ratings for sad
morphs. The mean rating
difference (from ratings given to
neutral faces) is shown for
increasing morphs of sadness,
for each subject group. The
differently colored lines show
the ratings given on the
different emotion labels (see
legend). BD = brain-damaged
controls with lesions sparing
the amygdala; L = unilateral left
amygdala damage group;
R = unilateral right amygdala
damage group; Bilat =
complete bilateral amygdala
damage group.
Figure 4. Correlations with
normal Ratings. Correlations for
happy (left) and sad (right)
morphs are shown for each
subject group (differently
colored lines). Mean
correlations for a group were
calculated from the averaged
z-transformed correlations for
individuals. BD = brain-
damaged controls with lesions
sparing the amygdala; L =
unilateral left amygdala damage
group; R = unilateral right
amygdala damage group;
Bilat = complete bilateral
amygdala damage group.
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The abnormally low correlations for sadness in subjects
with bilateral amygdala damage reflect what is apparent
from Figure 3: They are less specific in their ratings of
the emotion. Whereas other subject groups make a
distinction between sadness and other emotions, sub-
jects with bilateral amygdala damage do not. Whereas
the ratings of subjects in all other groups correlated
significantly ( p < .05) with normal ratings, those of 3/5
of the subjects with bilateral amygdala damage did not.
One can derive a specificity index from these ratings, by
calculating the rating difference between ratings given
on the correct label, sad, and on other, incorrect labels.
Such a specificity calculation corroborates the impaired
ability of subjects with bilateral amygdala damage
to judge sadness as distinct from other emotions
(Figure 5). A further observation evident from Figures
4 and 5 was that, as a group, subjects with right
unilateral amygdala damage were somewhat more im-
paired than were subjects with left unilateral amygdala
damage, a finding broadly consistent with prior lesion
studies (Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2001; Anderson
et al., 2000).
A final question of interest was whether the abnormal
pattern of ratings given by subjects with bilateral amyg-
dala damage might result from less consistency within
each subject (more ‘‘noise’’ in each individual’s data), or
from ratings given by each subject that were consistently
abnormal. Three of the five subjects with bilateral amyg-
dala damage had repeated the task, as had seven brain-
damaged controls. We therefore calculated consistency
measures between the two datasets for each subject. We
found that subjects with bilateral amygdala damage did
not differ in their consistency from brain-damaged con-
trols, either in the labels they assigned to stimuli, or in
the ratings that they gave them (Table 4; all consistency
measures for subjects with bilateral amygdala damage
are within a standard deviation of the mean consistency
measures for brain-damaged controls).
Labeling Task
Another commonly used task (Schmolck & Squire, 2001;
Broks et al., 1998; Calder et al., 1996) asks subjects to
choose one word from a list of the basic emotions. This
task introduces the additional complexity that there are
not equally many confusable response options available
for each target emotion (for instance, happiness is the
only unambiguously positive emotion, whereas there are
many negatively valenced emotions that can potentially
Table 1. Background Neuropsychology
Age Education Sex PIQ VIQ Benton BDI
BDC 59 ± 11 12 ± 2 5 women/7 men 100 ± 13 92 ± 12 46 ± 4 6 ± 9
R Amy 36 ± 10 14 ± 2 3 women/8 men 106 ± 18 95 ± 14 44 ± 4 5 ± 3
L Amy 36 ± 10 13 ± 2 9 women/7 men 103 ± 11 95 ± 14 44 ± 3 6 ± 5
Bilat 49 ± 13 14 ± 2 1 woman/4 men 92 ± 18 94 ± 12 43 ± 3 1 ± 1
Means and SD are shown for brain-damaged controls (BDC), and subjects with unilateral (R, L) and bilateral (Bilat) amygdala damage on age,
education (in years), sex distribution, performance and verbal IQ (PIQ, VIQ, from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Revised), facial
discrimination (Benton, from the Benton Faces Task, all in the normal range), and depression (BDI, Beck Depression Inventory, none severely
depressed).
Figure 5. Specificity of ratings.
Specificity was calculated as the
difference between ratings on
the emotion shown (e.g., ratings
on ‘‘sad’’ when shown sad
morphs) and the mean of
ratings on all the other emotions
(ratings on other emotion labels
when shown the sad morphs).
Specificity scores are shown for
happy (left) and sad (right)
morphs for each subject group
(differently colored lines). BD =
brain-damaged controls with
lesions sparing the amygdala;
L = unilateral left amygdala
damage group; R = unilateral
right amygdala damaged group;
Bilat = complete bilateral
amygdala damage group.
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be confused with one another; Adolphs, 2002). On the
other hand, the task can also be considered easier,
because it requires only a categorical response rather
than the more detailed ratings on all the different
emotions that the above rating task required.
When subjects were asked to match stimuli to the
best label from a list of the six basic emotion words,
labeling for sad and happy morphs showed very similar
patterns in all subject groups (data not shown). The
intended emotion was labeled the highest proportion
of the time, and in general labeling provided more
discrimination between emotions than did rating. This
effect would be expected, since labeling forces subjects
to choose a single label, whereas ratings encourage
them to assign multiple emotions to a single stimulus.
Particularly notable was the entirely intact ability of
Table 3. Characterization of the Stimuli in Terms of Labeling
Stimulus Morph Label: happy Surprise Afraid Angry Disgust Sad
Happy 2 0.65 0.12 0.04 0.08 0 0.12
Happy 3 0.65 0.15 0.04 0 0.04 0.12
Happy 4 0.92 0 0.04 0 0.04 0
Happy 5 0.81 0 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04
Happy 6 0.81 0.04 0 0 0.12 0.04
Sad 5 0.12 0 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.62
Sad 6 0.15 0 0.12 0 0.04 0.69
Sad 7 0 0 0.04 0 0.04 0.92
Sad 8 0 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.73
Sad 9 0.04 0.04 0 0.04 0.08 0.81
Neutral 0 0.42 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.19
Neutral 0 0.27 0 0 0.31 0.15 0.27
Neutral 0 0.5 0.08 0 0.19 0.04 0.19
Mean proportion of stimuli that received a given label by normal controls are shown. Bold type shows proportion labeled as intended emotion.
Table 2. Characterization of Stimuli in Terms of Discriminability and Emotion Ratings
Stimulus Morph Number Discrim. Happy Sad Disgust Anger Fear Surprise
Happy 2 0.79 4.58 2.38 1.50 1.88 1.46 2.00
Happy 3 0.88 4.54 2.19 1.35 1.38 1.92 2.77
Happy 4 0.93 6.35 1.62 1.65 1.50 1.69 2.00
Happy 5 0.93 6.73 1.50 1.54 1.35 1.65 2.62
Happy 6 0.97 7.04 1.65 1.65 1.27 1.23 2.81
Sad 5 0.89 2.42 6.19 1.96 2.65 2.46 1.58
Sad 6 0.95 2.15 6.81 1.69 1.77 3.15 1.65
Sad 7 0.98 1.54 6.85 2.62 2.12 3.04 1.46
Sad 8 0.99 1.65 7.19 2.38 2.35 3.23 1.85
Sad 9 0.98 1.42 7.65 2.27 2.15 3.96 1.69
Neutral 0 N/A 3.23 3.50 1.27 2.81 1.58 1.50
Neutral 0 N/A 3.38 3.42 2.04 3.27 1.85 1.38
Neutral 0 N/A 3.46 3.38 1.77 2.81 1.65 1.69
Mean discriminability (proportion correctly discriminated from a neutral face), and mean ratings on emotion labels given by normal controls are
shown. Numbers in bold type indicate ratings on the intended emotion label.
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subjects with bilateral amygdala damage to label sad
morphs, despite their impaired ability to assign differ-
ential ratings to them.
DISCUSSION
We used a sensitive task that permitted us to plot
emotion rating and labeling as a function of increasing
structural change in the morph stimulus. At least two
points are worth emphasizing here: Our stimuli should
be more sensitive to possible impairment than proto-
typical emotional expressions, and they should also be
more typical of emotions encountered in everyday life.
That is, the prototypical expressions often used in
studies are in fact not typical or modal stimuli with
respect to real life (Horstmann, 2002). Given the data
we obtained, it would seem preferable in future studies
to use morphs of emotional expressions rather than
only the prototypes, as has typically been done. Fur-
thermore, we used the two different tasks that have
been most commonly used to assess judgment of
emotions from facial expressions. In addition to these
within-subject factors of emotion intensity and task
condition, we had a between-subjects factor of lesion
group, comparing performances given by subjects with
bilateral amygdala damage to those with unilateral
amygdala damage, brain damage sparing the amygdala,
and normal controls.
We found that subjects with bilateral amygdala dam-
age stood out as a group showing impaired perform-
ances. Their impairments were specific to judging
sadness rather than happiness, and to performing the
rating task rather than the labeling task. Moreover, the
impairment could not be attributed to the smaller
sample size of the group with bilateral amygdala dam-
age, nor simply to more inconsistent performance. The
data thus support the idea that bilateral damage to the
amygdala impairs processing of sadness from facial ex-
pressions, and that the rating task is more sensitive to
detect this impairment than the labeling task. A further
finding was that subjects with right temporal lobectomy
performed somewhat worse than subjects with left
temporal lobectomy (cf. Figures 4 and 5), consistent
with prior reports (Adolphs et al., 2001; Anderson et al.,
2000). One surprising aspect of this latter pattern was
that subjects with left temporal lobectomy in fact ap-
peared to be ‘‘more’’ sensitive to sad faces than even
normal controls (Figures 3 and 5).
There are two major caveats in the interpretation of
the data. First, four out of the five subjects with bilateral
amygdala damage had bilateral medial temporal lobe
damage that included the amygdala plus surrounding
structures and white matter. In support of the idea that
the findings from this group are representative of
bilateral amygdala damage, we found the same pattern
of impairment in the subject (SM046) with selective
bilateral amygdala damage, and we found no such
impairment in several brain-damaged control subjects
who had large lesions. A second caveat concerns the
issue of task difficulty. Could the findings be explained
by positing that rating sad morphs is generally more
difficult than rating happy morphs? We contend that
this is implausible, simply from an examination of the
performances of control subjects in Figures 2 and 3.
Normal and brain-damaged controls both assigned in-
tensity ratings to the weakest happy morphs that were
no greater than those assigned to the weakest sad
morphs, confirming the design of our stimuli which
attempted to generate roughly equally weak stimuli
(our morphing method ensured that this was the case
in terms of the discriminability of the morphed emotion
from a neutral face when shown side by side; the
ratings shown in Figures 2 and 3 show that this is also
the case when subjects rate each individual morph on
Table 4. Consistency Measures for Three Subjects With Bilateral Amygdala Damage (SM, JM, and RH), Compared With Brain-
damaged Controls (BDC mean)
Subject Emotion Label Happy Sad Disgust Anger Fear Surprise
SM happy 0 2.2 0.2 0 0 0 0
sad 0 1.4 2.2 0 0 0 0
JM happy 0 2.4 0.2 0 0 0 3
sad 4 2 2.6 3.2 1.8 0.8 4.4
RH happy 0 1.2 1.4 1.8 2 1.6 1.8
sad 2 1 0.8 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.4
BDC
mean
happy 1.6 2.3 1.8 2.1 1.3 1.8 2.4
sad 1.9 1.1 1.7 2.7 1.6 3.3 1.7
Mean consistency is shown for all those stimuli in an emotion category. Label consistency was calculated as the number of times a subject changed a
label for a stimulus in that emotion category. Rating consistencies to the six labels was calculated as the absolute value of the difference in ratings
given on the two testing occasions.
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the intended emotion). Controls also gave intensity
ratings to the unintended emotions that were as great
for happiness as they were for sadness. When we
compare the two left plots (normal and brain-damaged
controls) for happiness (Figure 2) and sadness
(Figure 3), it appears that, if anything, happiness was
generally harder for controls to recognize than sadness.
Yet the data from the subjects with bilateral amygdala
damage provide a striking contrast: Their ratings of
sadness are lower and less specific than their ratings
of happiness. Furthermore, if their impairment was due
to nonspecific difficulty, then it should be noticeably
more severe for the fainter sad morphs than for the
stronger sad morphs: but this does not appear to be the
case. When closely examining the patterns of data, then,
the possibility that the impaired sadness ratings given
by subjects with bilateral amygdala damage could be
attributed to nonspecific difficulty is not supported.
Notwithstanding these considerations, it will be impor-
tant in future studies to verify this impression by
obtaining additional measures that assess task difficulty,
such as reaction times to the stimuli.
How can we make sense of the errors made by
subjects with bilateral amygdala damage? Across the
different emotion morphs, an overall pattern of impair-
ment emerged in subjects with bilateral amygdala dam-
age: They apparently confused emotions that are
configurally (Dailey, Cottrell, Padgett, & Adolphs, 2002)
and semantically (Adolphs et al., 1994; Russell, 1980)
closely related. Thus, happiness is confused to some
extent with surprise, and sadness with disgust. Both of
these confusions are also occasionally made by normal
subjects, but bilateral amygdala damage appears to
result in more intrusions of unintended emotions, as
well as lower intensity ratings on the intended emotion,
which together produced less specificity. Intrusions of
incorrect emotions have also been noted in other
studies that have analyzed data from subjects with
bilateral amygdala damage (Sato et al., 2002; Schmolck
& Squire, 2001).
It is interesting that we found no impairment on the
same stimuli when using the labeling task. One possi-
ble explanation might be that the labeling task was
always administered after the rating task, when subjects
would have had more experience with the stimuli. An
argument against this possibility is that we did not find
any improvement in rating task performances in those
subjects who were administered multiple rating tasks.
Another interpretation is that the rating task can detect
impairments that the labeling task cannot. For instance,
a subject may be unable to assign normal ratings to
expressions of sadness, when rating across multiple
emotions, but may nonetheless be able to figure out
that the label ‘‘sad’’ is more appropriate than any other
label. These findings emphasize the importance of
using multiple tasks in providing a thorough assess-
ment of emotion processing abilities.
The impaired judgment of sadness following bilateral
amygdala damage extends the amygdala’s role beyond
processing of fear; the relatively intact judgment of
happiness restricts it to negatively valenced emotions.
While the findings to date do not yet provide a
complete account of precisely which emotions depend
on the amygdala, they support the idea that several
emotions of negative valence have such a dependency.
Furthermore, the present findings still leave open the
possibility that fear processing is even more dependent
on the amygdala than is sadness processing. A goal for
the future will be a specification of what factor it is that
is shared in common by all those emotions (and, for
that matter, other social information) whose processing
depends on the amygdala. Additional studies with
stimuli such as the ones used here, with a variety of
tasks, and using both lesion and functional imaging
methods, will be needed to address this topic.
METHODS
Subjects
We tested 26 normal subjects with no history of neuro-
logical or psychiatric disease, 16 subjects with unilateral
left amygdala damage, 11 with unilateral right amygdala
damage, 5 with complete bilateral amygdala damage, and
12 brain-damaged controls with lesions that spared the
amygdala. All subjects were selected from the Depart-
ment of Neurology’s Patient Registry, and had been fully
characterized both in terms of their background neuro-
psychology as well as location and extent of lesion. All
subjects with unilateral amygdala damage had under-
gone neurosurgical resection for the treatment of tem-
poral lobe epilepsy. All brain-damaged controls had
lesions due to stroke. Subjects with bilateral amygdala
damage included one subject with selective bilateral
amygdala damage due to Urbach–Wiethe disease
(SM046), and four with complete but nonselective amyg-
dala damage due to encephalitis. Neuropsychological
and demographic background data are given in Table
1. Most critically, the impaired performances of subjects
with bilateral amygdala damage described below could
not be attributed to any basic visuoperceptual impair-
ment: Their performance IQ, ability to discriminate faces
(from the Benton Faces task), and other measures of
visuoperceptual ability did not differ from those of the
other subject groups.
All subjects gave informed written consent to partic-
ipate in the studies, in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki and as approved by the institutional review
board of the University of Iowa.
Stimuli
We chose morphs of a single individual’s face (PE)
from the Ekman and Friesen stimulus set. We gener-
ated linear morphs between a neutral expression and a
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happy or sad prototypical expression, as described in
detail previously ( Jansari, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2000).
We generated a series of 19 morphs, progressing from
the neutral face to the emotional face (i.e., the first 9
were more similar to neutral, while the last 9 were
more similar to the emotion, and the 10th was exactly
intermediate). Figure 1 shows examples of the stimuli
we used.
In a prior experiment ( Jansari et al., 2000), an
independent set of 28 normal subjects (different from
the 26 used in the present study) had provided data on
the discriminability of these morphs from a neutral
face. We chose our stimuli such that their discrimina-
bility from neutral ranged between 80% and 100%, thus
focusing on stimuli that were just sufficiently different
from neutral that they could be reliably discriminated
most of the time by normal subjects. We chose five
morphs each of a happy face (morphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 from
the initial series of 19), and of a sad face (morphs 5, 6,
7, 8, 9). The lower morph numbers for happiness
reflect the fact that a prototypical happy face is con-
figurally more distant from a neutral face than are
prototypical sad faces, due primarily to the large
change in mouth configuration (the smile), which
makes them easier to discriminate. In addition to these
faint emotion morphs, we showed subjects three neu-
tral faces, for a total of 13 stimuli.
Experimental Task
Rating Task
Subjects were shown the stimuli one at a time with
notime limit, and asked to provide a rating on a scale
of 1–10 for each of the basic emotions. Stimuli were
presented in randomized order, and the entire series
was rated on one emotion at a time before proceeding
to the next emotion; thus the entire stimulus set was
seen six times in order to rate them on the six basic
emotions (happy, afraid, surprised, angry, disgusted,
sad) (Schmolck & Squire, 2001; Adolphs et al., 1995;
Adolphs, Tranel, et al., 1999). We calculated, for each
subject and each stimulus, the difference between rat-
ings given to that stimulus for an emotion morph
stimulus compared with that subject’s mean rating of
the three neutral stimuli. Thus, Figures 2 and 3 show
how much more (or less) intense subjects judged the
morphs to exhibit specific emotions than neutral faces.
This scoring procedure corrected for any baseline biases
that subjects might have had in assigning emotion
ratings, by subtracting the emotional intensity they
attribute to an entirely neutral expression.
Labeling Task
Upon completion of the rating task, subjects were
presented with a list of the six emotion labels and given
a six-alternative forced-choice task in which they had to
choose the label best describing the stimuli (Schmolck &
Squire, 2001; Broks et al., 1998; Calder et al., 1996).
Accuracy scores were calculated as means of the binary
correctness scores (0 = incorrect, 1 = correct). The
labeling task was always given after the ratings task, as
the categorical response it required could potentially
bias the more unconstrained ratings that subjects could
give on the ratings task.
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